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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
" OOOOO 
: : - ' - : . - i . . - • • - ) 
JOHN H. MORGAN, SR., JOHN H. MORGAN, 
JR., CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, JUSTHEIM 
PETROLEUM COMPANY, and HUSKY OIL 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
- v -
BOARD OF STATE LANDS OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, DIVISION OF STATE LANDS, a 
division of the UTAH STATE DEPART-
MENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, and 
CHARLES R. HANSEN, as Director of 
the DIVISION OF STATE LANDS, 
• - Defendants-Respondents. 
•-ooOoo 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants filed suit to obtain a declaratory 
judgment that there was an "implied contract1* with the Board of 
State Lands for replacement of 1963 oil shale leases expiring 
December '31# 1973# with the new form of 20-year leases authorized 
by the Board in 1.965, notwithstanding the lessees failed to pay 
the six cents per acre conversion fee and filing fees/ and also 
failed to sign and file the required applications to amend the 
1963 leases or the amended form of oil shale leases at any time 
prior to the expiration dates of the 10-year leases. 
Case No. 14115 
) 
) 
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DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Following discovery proceedings, Defendants-Respondents 
filed a motion for summary judgment supported by uncontroverted 
affidavits. Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a counter motion for 
summary judgment, with an affidavit. Counsel for the respective 
parties stated that if a trial were conducted, no further evidence 
would be presented. The District Court denied Plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment and granted Defendants1 motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the 10-year oil shale leases issued 
in 1963 expired by their express terms on December 31, 1973, and , 
that the lessees had failed and neglected to pay the required fees 
or to execute the documents required by the Board of State Lands I 
to effectuate a conversion of the 1963 leases into the 20-year • 
form of oil shale leases. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS J 
By reason of omission of nearly all of the admissions • 
contained in the complaint and by Plaintiffs in discovery proceed-
ings and because of incorrect assertions on pages 3 and 4 of | 
Brief of Appellants, Defendants-Respondents do not agree with the • 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Statement of Facts, except the following 
portions thereof on pages 2 to 4, which quoted statements only | 
are accepted: • 
/-.•J). I 
2 
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111# In 1963, the Board issued the Leases, 
to expire by their terms on December 31, 1963 /l9737# 
to the Morgans (admitted in pleadings). 
"2. In 1964, the Morgans assigned the Leases 
to Husky, but remained the Lessees of record to whom 
the Board sent notices and billings (R. 113). 
"3. In 1965# the Board adopted a 20 year lease 
form and passed a resolution that leases under pre-
viously issued oil shale leases should have opportunity 
to convert to the new form (R* 9-11, admitted in the 
pleadings)• 
"4. On September 29, 1965, the Director sent to 
all oil shale lessees a letter (herein called the 
September Letter1) in which a procedure for convert-
ing to the new 20 year lease form was explained (R. 21). 
* * * " • . « . : . . . : . . , 
The following statement also would be acceptable to re-
spondents with the word "required" in lieu of "suggested": 
"5. The record does not show that either Husky 
or the Morgans ever followed the conversion procedure 
suggested by the September Letter. * * * ." 
Also, the following statement on page 4 of Brief of Ap-
pellants is approved, subject to amplification hereinafter: 
"7. Early in 1974, after the Board had cashed 
Appellants' rental payment check, the Board returned 
the money to Appellants with the announcement that it 
considered the Leases to have expired (R. 50-52)." 
Respondents present the following additional facts deemed 
to be relevant and material: 
The letter from the Director, dated September 29, 1965, 
a copy of which (except for his signature) is attached to the 
3 
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complaint as Exhibit "C" (R. 21# 190), stated, inter alia: 
11
 * * * the Utah State Land Board at its meet-
ing held September 9-10, 1965, made the following de-
cisions relative to the proposed amended Oil Shale 
Lease form and the proposed amended Asphaltic Sands-
Bituminous Sands lease form: 
"(1) It adopted the attached form of Oil Shale 
lease subject to approval by the Attorney General's 
Office* The Board also indicated that the Staff 
should continue issuing Oil Shale leases on a multi-
ple-use basis. 
"These forms were formally approved by the Attor-
ney General by letter of September 20, 1965. 
"For your information, enclosed please find 
copy of the new Oil Shale lease form, copy of the addendum 
to the Asphaltic Sands-Bituminous Sands lease and copy 
of a form of application to amend. 
"Applications to amend existing Oil Shale leases 
* * * will be granted upon receipt by this office of a 
fully executed application and a fully executed amend-
ment of Oil Shale lease * * * . The applicant must also 
tender a sum equal to 6fi per acre of the leased land to-
gether with a $2.00 filing fee." (R. 21, 190). 
By paragraph 6 of the complaint, plaintiffs "acknowledge 
receipt of said letter" (R. 3). By paragraph 7 of their complaint, 
it is expressly alleged that "Plaintiffs took no formal action with 
regard to the leases in response to Exhibit 'C'" (R.3). Attached 
to the complaint as Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of one of the 1963 
oil shale leases (R. 6-8). By paragraph 3 of the complaint, it 
is stated that the 1963 leases issued to plaintiffs "were to expire, 
by their terms as originally issued, on December 31, 1973" (R.2-3). 
4 
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Exhibit "B", attached tb the;complaint* consists of quotations 
from some minutes of the State Land Bda^d meetings in 1965 
(R, 9-11). Exhibit ,,B-ln, attached to the complaint, is a — 
photocopy of the form of application to amend the 1963 oil shale 
leases, signed by a third party (R. 12). It recites that "Lessee 
hereby requests th6i Board to grant^an amendment of this lease*1 
and also sjiat&s that "in ^ consideration therefor Lessee tenders 
to the State a cash consideration of •. *'-' • -' *•" :' :':"-''"*' f!-• •'• •' • 
Dollars ($ )# being six cents ($.06) per leased acre, for 
such am^ to the complaint; is a 
photocopy of the arnended form of Utah State Oil Shale Lease for a 
term of 20, years (R. 13-20). i^ > 4 ^  -, 
In response to defendants1 interrogatories of August 21, 
1974 (R. 109-111), plaintiffs admitted that "no one of plaintiffs" 
could "recall having delivered to or otherwise filed at the State 
Laxid Office" any application to amend mineral lease relating to 
any of the oil shale leases referred to in paragraph 3 of the com-
plaint or signing and filing in the State Land Office the form of 
"Amended State of Utah Oil Shale Lease" (Exhibit "B-2", attached 
to the complaint).plaintiffs also admitted that they did not at 
any time prior to January 1, 1974, pay or tender to the State Land 
Board the six cents ($.06) per acre conversion fee and the $2.00 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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filing fee mentioned in the letter from the Director.dated , ./ 
September 29, 1965 (Exhibit "C") (R. 72-73). In response to 
defendants1 requests for admissions of fact (R.63-66), plaintiffs, 
admitted that the 1963 oil shale leases by their own terms would 
expire December 31, 1973; that no assignment of any of the 1963 
leases ever was filed in the State Land Office; that each of the 
plaintiffs who was a lessee under the 1963 oil shale leases re-
ceived the letter dated May 11, 1965, a copy of which was attached 
to the answer of defendants as Exhibit "1"; that each of the said 
lessees received a copy of the letter dated September 29, 1965, 
from Max C. Gardner, Director of the State Land Board, in the 
regular course of the mails; and that each of the plaintiff les-
sees received with said letter dated September 29, 1965, the form 
of "Application to Amend Mineral Lease" (Exhibit "B-l") and also 
the form of "Amended Utah Oil Shale Lease," a copy of which is 
attached to the complaint as Exhibit "B-2"; and that the Attorney 
j.' 
General of the State of Utah, on or about September 20, 1965, ap-
proved said form of "Amended State of Utah Oil Shale Lease" 
(R. 70-71). 
In paragraph 7 of their complaint, plaintiffs alleged 
that they 
" . . . took no formal action with regard to 
the leases in response to Exhibit 'C, but plaintiffs 
orally communicated to defendant's director and other 
6 
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personnel their desire and intent that the 
leases be replaced by the new form of oil shale 
.•••-.."•• lease adopted * * *." (R, 1) • , , . . 
plaintiffs'did not allege that thoy ever executed and filed either 
the "Application to Amend Mineral Lease" or the amended form of 
.Utah OiJ Shale Lease, copies of which a) >: attached id I he com-
plaint as Exhibits "b-1" and "13—2-n In paragraph 7 of their 
.complaint* plaintiffs alleged that "Defendant amended 11 n >ic -
counting forma and billing rvirds to show the replacement of the 
leases,;:with new form leases" and that the accounting cards wore 
modified by defendant i;o irefl ect the i n iderstanding that the 
leases had Lean extended*" (Rr 3). . . . -;"'.;.; .:.'< ••.••.•••••...' -..N 
Plaintiffs also alleged: . • '.,•:,,,•-:•> • , ;:-: • -'-^  . 
. - .-"."' "8. On or about December 15, 1973, defendant ,,
 r ;\ 
billed plaintiffs for the 1974 rentals (1974 being 
• .
 -#'•'* the rental year after the leases would have expired 
' unless extended in accordance with the procedures 
,'. . . hereinabove set forth) and plaintiffs paid the said 
• 1974 rentals as billed during the. calendar year 1973. 
fl9« Plaintiffs' relied on .the billings for 1974 
-v.:. p'-} .: ..-rentals as representing an acknowledgment by the de-
**••/ ' fendant of the leases having been replaced, and, ex-
••;—;- ; v. r.cept for defendant's actions in transmitting said 
billings, would have been alerted by their failure 
to receive billings that some question as to the con-
v
 tinned'force and effect of the leases had arisen," 
'"'''By paragraph 10, plaintiffs alleged that some time during 
January'or February L'//4, defendants adv:i sed plaintiffs that the 
l e a s e s haa n ot been replaced by the new form leases and that re-
placement could not tlion be effected,, Ix-cansu pi,i i nLi f< ,:, had 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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failed to pay the six cents ($.06) per acre conversion fee, 
but plaintiffs then tendered payment of the six cents ($.06) per 
acre. Plaintiffs also alleged that they "protested defendant's 
termination of the leases# and that the parties1 actions as herein 
set forth have effected the replacement of the leases by new form 
leases, and defendant may not now deny such replacement." Plaint-
iffs also alleged that they were afforded opportunity to present 
their case to defendant at a formal meeting; and after hearing, 
defendant reasserted that "the leases have been terminated (R. 4). 
Plaintiffs prayed for Judgment "declaring that the leases 
have been replaced by the new form oil shale lease adopted by de-
fendant in September, 1965, and that defendant is under obligation 
to accept the fees for conversion heretofore tendered by plaintiffs 
and to effect a formal replacement of the leases with the new form 
of oil shale leases" (R. 5). 
By the FIRST DEFENSE in their answer, defendants alleged 
that the "complaint fails to state facts constituting a claim for 
judicial relief" (R. 29). . 
By their answer, defendants specifically denied that 
there was ever any "understanding" that any of the 1963 leases 
"had been extended." Defendants alleged that none of the plaint-
iffs complied with the terms and conditions of the letter dated 
8 
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September 29, 19A5, Defendants denied that there was any 
authorized "amendment of U s >v count i ng forms and billing cards 
to show replacement of any oi3. shale leases with the new or 
amended form of oil shaie leases, except as to IV ^ lessees 
who complied with the conditions and requirements of Exhibit * Cf 
by paying the six cents per acre conversion fee, the $2*00 fiiinq 
fee# and executed the application to amend oil shale lease and 
also executed the amended form of oil shale le-ise authorized b-/ 
the Board (R, 30)." Defendants fuxrthe? B! le^e "1 that sending 
"billings" (notices) fox. 19V4 rentals to Lessees under 1963 oil 
shale leases who had not compi i:;a V/IL- •.>.•:• \.^' ,-r.i of the letter 
dated Sept em« »er Jc), 190S (Exhibit "C" attached fn complaint),, was 
unauthorized by the Bo=ari and was n r lerical error, (K, 11) \r -
fendants ais. denied tfia they "terminated" any of the 1963 oil 
shale leases and alleged that plaintiffs utterly failed to comply 
with the offer oi the Boai I f"ot funicsndmrjnt of nuch 1903 oil shale 
leases, and that plaintiffs, "by their own neglect, had allowed 
said 1963 leases to expire by noncompliance with i hr- ul fer con-
tained in said letter dated September 29, 1965 (u„ 32)* 
By affirmative defenses defendants aiiegou; (a) in,it «, C 
any oral ^oreemeni or "understanding" had been made, such as 
claimed, by plaintiffs, the same would have been without statutory 
authority, contrary tu IJM rules and fc-on lat ions of the Board, 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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without consideration and null and void, (b) that Section 
65-1-18, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, requires applications for 
mineral leases to be "on such forms as the land board shall 
prescribe," and the Board, in 1965, prescribed the form of ap-
plication to amend mineral lease, and also prescribed the amended 
form of 20-year oil shale lease, and issued notice by letter 
dated September 29, 1965, together with the forms to be executed 
and returned to the State Land Office with the required fees 
(R. 33), (c) that at no time prior to expiration of the 1963 oil 
shale leases for a term of 10 years did any of plaintiffs comply 
with any of the terms and conditions specified by the Board for 
converting the 1963 leases into 20-year oil shale leases, (d) 
that any oral "agreement" or "understanding" that the 10-year 
leases were "extended" or "converted" into 20-year oil shale leases, 
if made, would have been null and void contrary to the Statute of 
Frauds, Section 25-5-4(1), U.C.A. 1953, and Section 25-5-1, U.C.A. 
1953, (e) that Section 65-1-46, U.C.A. 1953, always has provided 
that "each lease shall contain covenants" specified in the statute, 
and that none of plaintiffs executed the application nor the form 
of lease prior to expiration date of the 1963 leases, and that by 
reason of nonexecution of the required documents each plaintiff was 
and is estopped to claim a 20-year oil shale lease, (f) that Sec-
tion 65-1-23, U.C.A. 1953, as amended in 1959, provides that the 
10 
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Board shall prescribe the form ^f a^n - • . • ** >r>r--
lease, the annual rental, and the royalty and other details, 
(g) that excerpts fr^ rr i9^H minutes of meetings ', = . <• ,; -^ ru 
shown in Exhib.i . ^ '.s.-V-Hd i-n the complaint, show that che • 
Board adopted the form of application and the form of 20-year 
oil shale lease, and prescribed the £ef\s for converting 10-year 
leases into 20-year leases, and that each of the -olainilffs failed 
and neglected to pay the rnquLroa n^&^ .»nc: .:o. .,«• -o«: . * v.-,-, ;/. 
the required documents, r'") -chat no statute autno^i^ed -.^ y waiver 
or exception to compliance with the offer made b/ VH- L- ».-.* f'i 
that Sectio: • -^„.. ~ j> sea: 
"c'xLl i.eup.es ,raJ r'oncract.:- ~;f every kind entered 
inti~- by the frtate ban*; Board shall before execution 
by such Board be ;-tpproveo as *•* form by the Attorney 
Gerun'riJ . " 
No claimed "oral understanding" was or could be approved by the 
Attorney General >.-•-,. 
It is undisputed that on December 31, 1973, a letter was 
received at the State Land ofla.co dat/:d December /' 7, 1M7T, from 
fftah Resources International, Inc., signed by John H. Morgan, Jr., 
which stated: . 
" E n c l o s e d n« jewi-cn e h e c ^ in L ne a^non^t o : 
$2'*,. 2 5 8 . 5 0 c o v e r i n g lc>74 r e n t a l s on ' >-c- Uta'i M.ate 
O i l o h a l o , j i l , Gas 6, ^hydrocarbon^ and b i t u m i n o u s 
Sands L e a s e e a s f a l l o w s : 
"'iib^JX^?-JJfiL <ljbV. Renta l 
20668 624 .60 G25.00
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/The list included 25 oil shale leases identi-
fied by lease numbers set forth in paragraph 3 of 
the complaint, issued in 1963, together with 16 oil, 
gas and hydrocarbon leases and 2 bituminous sands 
leases identified by lease numbers^ 
Accompanying such letter was a check in the name of Utah 
Resources International, Inc., signed by John H. Morgan, Jr., 
payable to the Division of State Lands in the total amount of 
$24,258.50 (R. 46-48, 50-51). Said check was deposited for 
collection on January 4, 1974. Donald G. Prince, of the Division 
of State Lands, stated under oath that said check was not returned 
to sender for the reason that it included amounts becoming due for 
1974 rentals on some oil, gas and hyrdrocarbon leases and also on 
bituminous sands leases not expiring (R. 49-53). 
On March 8, 1974, the Board of State Lands directed a 
refund of a total of $13,834.00 for the "1974 rentals" paid on 
the 1963 oil shale leases which the Board found had expired on 
December 31, 1973. Said refund checks were mailed on March 12, 
1974 (R. 52, 68-69). Plaintiffs then requested the Board to 
"acknowledge" said leases as having been "extended," claiming 
that the opinion of an assistant attorney general to the effect 
that the 1963 oil shale leases had expired on December 31, 1973, 
was in error. The Board of State Lands granted plaintiffs a 
hearing, which was held April 17, 1974 (R. 78). 
12 • * ' . 
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Prior to such hearing before the Board, under date of 
February 26, 1974, Utah Resources International, Inc., by its 
president, John H. Morgan, Jr., issued to the Division of State 
Lands a check for $829.78, as the computed six cents ($.06) per 
acre in each of the 1963 oil shale leases which had been issued 
to plaintiffs (except Husky). Following the April hearing by the 
Board of State Lands, the Board advised the applicants in writing 
that they had failed to prove compliance with the terms and condi-
tions of the letter dated September 29, 1965, and that all of the 
1963 oil shale leases issued to them had expired December 31, 1973, 
and could not be reinstated. The check for $829.78 was also re-
turned (R. 65-69, 70-71). 
Plaintiffs then filed suit for declaratory judgment. 
Following discovery proceedings, defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment of "no cause of action," supported by affidavits 
of Max C. Gardner, former Director of the Board of State Lands, 
Charles R. Hansen, who has been Director of the Division of State 
Lands since April 26, 1967, and Donald G. Prince, a member of the 
staff of the State Land Office since 1954 (R. 81-92, 93-97, 98-104, 
105-108). Plaintiffs then filed a counter-motion for summary 
judgment, together with affidavit of John H. Morgan, Jr., one of 
plaintiffs, along with copy of agreements between the other 
plaintiffs and Husky Oil Company (R. 112-129). At the time of 
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hearing on the respective motions for summary judgment, it 
was conceded by counsel for the respective parties that all evi-
dence which the parties could produce, including affidavits cover-
ing all testimony which could be presented at a trial, was before 
the court; and that if a trial were held, no further evidence 
would be submitted. 
In addition to oral arguments, counsel submitted written 
memoranda. The case was taken under advisement January 21, 1975. 
On April 18, 1975, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, District Judge, 
denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted defend-
ants1 motion for summary judgment (R. 187). Summary judgment of 
"no cause of action" against plaintiffs and in favor of all of the 
defendants and judgment of dismissal of the action with prejudice 
were entered April 29, 1975. From such judgment plaintiffs appealed 
(R. 188-193, 195), 
On May 29, 1975, plaintiffs-appellants filed their "STATE-
MENT OF POINTS" with their designation of the record, by which 
they alleged: 
"1. The evidence is insufficient to support the find-
ings of the court that, as a matter of law, there was 
no implied agreement between the parties for extension 
of the leases which are the subject of this litigation. 
"2. The evidence is insufficient to support the 
finding and ruling of the court that defendants are not 
estopped to deny the evidence of the leases which are 
the subject of this litigation "(R. 198). 
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„•• fiRGUMENT 
\M:1 POINT i . ' 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
SHOULD ' B*! AFFIRMED BY REASON 'OF UmMBIGUOUS WRITTEN INSTRU-
MENTS AND OTHER MATERIAL FACTS EXPRESSLY ADMITTED BY PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS IN THEIR COMPLAINT AND IN DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS, 
SHOWING (A) THAT THEIR 1963 OIL SHALE LEASES WOULD EXPIRE 
DECEMBER 31, 1973, AMD (B) BY REASON OF PLAINTIFFS' ADMITTED 
FAILURE TO TIMELY ACCEPT AND COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF 
THE 1965 WRITTEN OFFER OF THE LAND BOARD TO AMEND THE 1963 
LEASES INTO 20-YEAR LEASES. ,
 : 
The Brief of Appellants attempts to side-step nearly 
all of the fatal admissions made by plaintiffs-appellants in 
their complaint and in discovery proceedings. The applicable 
Utah statutes relating to mineral leasing of state lands are ^ 
ignored by appellants. In effect, what plaintiffs-appellants 
appear to seek by their appeal is judicial legislation for the 
special benefit of appellants, not only for suspension of the 
operation of some Utah statutes, but to relieve appellants of 
the consequences of their failure and neglect to accept timely 
and to comply with an offer made more than 8 years previously by 
the Board by letter dated September 29<f 1965, to all holders of 
10-year 1963 state oil shale leases (expiring December 31, 1973) 
to amend and convert those leases into the 1965 amended form of 
oil shale lease with a primary term of 20 years, and also con-
taining some different provisions. 
That 1965 offer made by the Board through its authorized 
Director could be accepted only (a) by payment of six cents ($.06) 
1 K 
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per acre conversion or amendment fee plus a filing fee per lease 
of §2.00; (b) by filing the required form of written application 
to amend the 1963 oil shale lease; and (c) by execution and de-
livery to the State Land Office of the amended form of oil shale 
lease adopted by the Board in 1965• 
There was no provision in the 1963 oil shale lease for 
any extension of the primary term of 10 years, except by produc-
tion . There never was any claim of production to preclude expira-
tion of the 1963 oil shale leases on December 31, 1973. The Land 
Board never made any offer to gratuitously extend the 10-year 
primary term of the 1963 oil shale leases. Exhibit "A", attached 
to the complaint, is a photocopy of one of the leases issued to 
one of the plaintiffs for a primary term of 10 years, which would 
expire and terminate on December 31, 1973, unless there were produc 
tion within the leasehold (R. 6-8). 
In paragraph 3 of the complaint, it is expressly admitted 
that the 1963 oil shale leases issued to plaintiffs "were to ex-
pire, by their terms as originally issued, on December 31, 1973 
(R. 2-3)." Plaintiffs also allege: 
"6. On or about September 29, 1965, defendant's 
director transmitted to all oil shale lessees by regu-
lar mail a letter, a copy of which is hereto attached 
as Exhibit 'C, and plaintiffs acknowledge receipt of 
said letter. 
"7. Plaintiffs took no formal action with re-
gard to the leases in response to Exhibit ' C , but 
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plaintiffs orally communicated to defendant's 
director and other personnel their desire and in-
tent that the leases be replaced by the new form of 
oil shale lease adopted as set forth in Exhibit 'B' 
/^^JT" (R. 3). 
Max C. Gardner was the Director of the State Land Board 
from 1961 to 1967. As Director, he signed the letter dated 
September 29, "196.5, Exhibit IICi,# attached to the complaint# ex-
cept for his signature). His affidavit, attached to defendants' 
motion for summary judgment (R. 93-97) never was controverted. 
Mr. Gardner, in his affidavit, stated/ inter alia: ' 
"5« As Director of the State Land Boatd, I 
signed the letter dated May 11, 1965, a copy of which 
is attached to the answer of defendants as Exhibit 'I'*, 
As Director I had a copy of such letter mailed to each 
of the record owners of oil shale leases which had been 
issued in 1963. As Director I also signed the letter 
*\ dated September 29, 1965, a copy of which is attached 
to the complaint as Exhibit 'C (except for my signa-
ture which is not shown on the exhibit attached to the 
complaint). Enclosed with that letter dated September 
29, 1965, mailed to each record owner of State oil shale 
leases was a copy of the form of application to amend 
the oil shale lease and also a copy of the new form of 
oil shale lease, a copy of which new form of oil shale 
lease is attached to the complaint as Exhibit '6-2". 
"6. Inasmuch as Donald G. Prince was the man in 
the State Land Office who had assigned to him the re-
sponsibility for processing mineral leases and applica-
tions to amend mineral leases, all applications to amend 
the 1963 oil shale leases and the processing of the 
• amended form of oil shale leases in the State Land 
Office would have been handled first by said Donald G. 
Prince. After he processed the documents, we held what 
we called 'Director's meetings'. We reviewed the docu-
ments processed and recommendations and any correspondence. 
17 
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In order to complete the amendment to oil shale 
leases, as Director I had to sign for the State 
of Utah and for the State Land Board the new form 
or revised form of oil shale lease, a copy of which 
is attached to the complaint as Exhibit 'B-2'. That 
would not have occurred under the established proce-
dures for processing mineral lease applications and 
any applications for amendments of mineral leases, 
until there was first received in the Land Office 
(a) the application to amend mineral lease duly 
signed by the record owner of the 1963 oil shale 
lease, (b) the remittance of six cents ($#06) per 
acre for amendment of the lease plus the filing fee 
of $2.00 per lease, and (c) the new form of oil shale 
lease in duplicate signed by the record owner of such 
1963 oil shale lease. The record owner of the 1963 
oil shale lease had to sign first each of the required 
documents and then deliver them to the State Land 
Office for processing, and then if foand in order by 
Donald G. Prince, then at a 'Director's meeting' the 
documents were examined by me, and if in proper order 
I then signed the new form of oil shale lease as Dir-
ector and one completely executed duplicate original 
of that lease was then sent back to the record lease 
owner as shown by the records of the State Land Office. 
"7. I have read paragraph 7 of the complaint, 
but to my best recollection none of the lessees named 
in the oil shale leases designated in paragraph 3 of 
the complaint ever told me personally or as director 
that he or they desired to convert or amend their ten 
year oil shale leases issued in 1963 into 20 year 
leases. If any of them had told me of any such intent, 
the procedure I would have followed would have been to 
state that it would be necessary to comply with the pro-
visions of the letter dated September 29, 1965. It was 
entirely optional with each record owner of a 1963 oil 
shale lease whether he or they complied with the terms 
and conditions specified by the State Land Board in 1965 
to amend the then existing oil shale lease or leases over 
into a 20 year oil shale lease as offered by the letter 
dated September 29, 1965" (R. 94-96). 
The affidavit of Max C. Gardner was corroborated by the 
uncontroverted affidavit of Donald G. Prince, also attached to 
18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendants' motion for summary judgment (R. 105-107). Mr. Prince# 
now Assistant Director of the Division of State Lands, has been an 
employee of the State of Utah in the Land Office since 1954. Mr. 
Prince stated, under oath: 
"3. One of my responsibilities was to check on the 
documents filed in the State Land Office involving any 
mineral lands and rights in mineral lands# including docu-
ments relating to the 1963 oil shale leases, to determine 
if the oil shale lease owners complied with the terms and 
conditions of the letter signed by Max C. Gardner, as 
Director, dated September 29, 1965, a copy of which is 
attached to the complaint as Exhibit 'C. Since the 
letter issued by the Director dated September 29, 1965, 
(Exhibit 'C') offered to amend the 1963 oil shale leases 
from 10 year leases to 20 year leases and a new or amended 
form of oil shale lease was adopted and approved by the 
Attorney General, before turning over to the Director the 
documents relating thereto, I ascertained in each case the 
following facts: (a) Whether the oil shale lease owner 
of record in the State Land Office had signed the 'Applica-
tion to Amend Mineral Lease', (b) whether the applicant 
signed in duplicate the "Amended Form' of oil shale lease; 
(c) whether the applicant paid the 6 cents per acre fee for 
the amended form of oil shale lease; and (d) whether the 
$2.00 fee required to accompany each application was paid. 
I had to determine whether all of the requirements of the 
letter dated September 29, 1965, had been met before I de-
livered them over to the Director with my recommendation 
for approval. The Director did not sign the amended form 
of oil shale lease in any case unless the lease owner of 
the 1963 oil shale lease had first executed such new form 
in duplicate. If any of those required items had been miss-
ing in any case, I would have written to the lease owner to 
mention the omission and the fact that the Director would 
not execute the amended form of oil shale lease until and 
unless all of those requirements had been met. 
"4. When all of those requirements had been met, I 
recommended approval at what we called a 'Director's meeting', 
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and after the documents were reviewed by the Director 
they were submitted to the State Land Board or to its 
successor Board of State Lands. I signed the defend-
ants' responses to plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions 
numbered 1 to 5 under date of August 2, 1974. I have 
attached copies of minutes of Lhe Board of State Lands 
showing Board approval in those cases wherein the 1963 
oil shale lease owners complied with the terms of the 
letter of the Director dated September 29, 1965. Those 
minutes show Board approval of compliance by Western Oil 
Shale Corporation, July 19, 1965; approval of applications 
of Shamrock Oil and Gas Corporation, and H. Glenn George 
on October 25, 1965, together with approval of applica-
tions of National Farmers Union Exploration Company, and 
John C. Osmond; approval of applications of Shell Oil Com-
pany on November 6, 1965; approval of applications of Pan 
American Petroleum Corporation December 20, 1965; and on 
October 30, 1967, approval of additional applications to 
amend oil shale leases by Western Oil Shale Corporation. 
There are no minutes of the State Land Board or of the 
Board of State Lands to approve any applications to amend 
as to 1963 oil shale leases referred to in paragraph 3 
of the complaint, for the reason that I know from my 
search of the lease case files that there was no compliance 
with the terms of said letter of September 29, 1965, nor 
anything in the lease case file to show any effort at com-
pliance at any time prior to December 31, 1973, when those 
leases would have expired by the terms of those leases. 
"5. No one ever contacted me on behalf of any of 
the record holders of the 1963 oil shale leases described 
in paragraph 3 of the complaint, down to and including 
December 31, 1973 * * * ." 
By adopting the new form of oil shale lease in 1965 with 
a primary term of 20 years instead of 10 years, and by the inclusion 
of some provisions differing from those contained in the 1963 form 
of oil shale leases, the Land Board could not unilaterally amend 
any of the existing unexpired 1963 oil shale leases. The letter 
dated September 29, 1965 (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 
"C" to the complaint, except for omission of the signature of the 
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Director of the State Land Board), set forth the unequivocal 
offer in writing made by the Land Board and precisely what the 
holders of 1963 oil shale leases had to do in order to accept 
the benefits of that offer: 
"Applications to amend existing Oil Shale 
leases or Asphaltic Sands-Bituminous Sands leases 
will be granted upon receipt by this office of a 
fully executed application and a fully executed 
amendment of Oil Shale lease or a fully executed 
addendum of Asphaltic Sands-Bituminous Sands lease 
whichever the case may be* The applicant must also 
tender a sum equal to 6^  per acre of the leased land 
together with a $2.00 filing fee*" (Emphasis added) 
The 1963 lease owners, as offerees, had to execute and 
return to the State Land Office the form of application to amend 
mineral lease adopted by the Board and the 1965 amended form of 
oil shale lease approved by the Attorney General on September 20, 
1965. In addition, the offerees had to pay, with those executed 
documents, a sum equal to six cents ($.06) per acre, plus a filing 
fee of $2.00 with each application. In order for an offeree to 
accept such offer, it was imperative to comply with each of the 
four requirements stated in that 1965 offer to amend the 1963 oil 
shale leases. Although there was no proof, even if plaintiffs had 
actually communicated orally "their desire and intent that the 
leases be replaced by the new form of oil shale lease," such oral 
expression could not legally constitute "acceptance." A tender of 
less than complete compliance with all four requirements of the 
offer would not amount to acceptance but a counter offer or 
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rejection of that offer. 
The general rule is that where an offer in writing does 
not specify the date by which it must be accepted, the law implies 
a "reasonable time" for such acceptance. Plaintiffs failed and 
neglected to comply with the requirements of the September, 1965, 
offer. Assuming, arguendo, that such written offer could have been 
construed legally to remain open until the last day of the term of 
the 1963 leases (which defendants do not concede), the plaintiffs, 
by their long continued neglect for more than 8 years and 3 months 
to exercise an option to amend granted in September of 1965, by 
noncompliance allowed their leases to expire and terminate on 
December 31, 1973. Following that expiration date, there no 
longer were any leases remaining in existence which could be 
amended. 
As shown by the uncontroverted affidavit of Donald G. 
Prince (R. 56-60, 105-107), during the year 1965 many of the 
lessees under 1963 oil shale leases fully complied with the four 
requirements of the September 1965 offer to amend their oil shale 
leases by executing the required documents and by paying the 
specified fees. The minutes of the Board show that the Board 
formally approved amendment of the 1963 oil shale leases for 
those who fully complied with the requirements stated in the 
offer dated September 29, 1965. 
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Summary judgment against plaintiffs was warranted 
by plaintiffs' own admissions that their 1963 oil shale leases 
would expire December 31, 1973, and that plaintiffs received 
copy of the written offer dated September 29, 1965, and did 
nothing required by the terms of that offer to effectuate an 
acceptance thereof and amendment of those leases to prevent them 
f£om expiring and terminating automatically on December 31, 1973. 
Plaintiffs, by paragraph 6 of their complaint, "acknow-
ledge receipt of said letter" dated September 29, 1965, from the 
Director of the State Land Board. By paragraph 7, it is expressly 
admitted that "Plaintiffs took no formal action with regard to the 
leases in response to Exhibit 'C (R. 3)." That admission, in 
plain language, means that plaintiffs did absolutely nothing to 
comply with the requirements of the Board for acceptance of the 
offer to amend, either by execution and delivery of the documents 
specified or by payment of any of the required fees. By answers 
to interrogatories submitted by defendants, plaintiffs in substance 
admitted (a) that they did not execute and file any application to 
amend any of the 1963 oil shale leases, (b) that they did not exe-
cute and deliver to the State Land Office the amended form of oil 
shale lease adopted in 1965, approved in form by the Attorney Gen-
eral, (c) that plaintiffs did not pay or tender the six cents 
($.06) per acre fee for the amendment of each lease prior to the 
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expiration date of the leases, and (d) that plaintiffs never 
paid the $2.00 filing fee at any time (R. 109-111). 
On pages 11 and 12 of the Brief of Appellants, there is 
an attempt to side-step plaintiffs1 unequivocal admissions that 
they did not do the four things required by the letter dated 
September 29, 1965, by the untenable argument that 
" . . . the September Letter does not purport 
to state an exclusive means of conversion, and (2) 
the September Letter was never sanctified by any 
Board action reflected by the minutes (i.e., the 
Director was never instructed or authorized to send 
it).11 
Appellants make no claim that the Board ever made any 
different or substitute offer to amend the 1963 oil shale leases. 
The offer in the letter of September 29, 1965, sent by the Dir-
ector of the State Land Board was the exclusive and only form of 
offer made, and it was in accordance with the minutes. The lessees 
had no power to unilaterally amend the leases on their own terms. 
If the appellants could say correctly that the Director never was 
authorized to send the letter in question, then appellants infer 
that there was no valid offer to amend by the letter offer of 
September 29, 1965. That would mean that the 1963 oil shale 
leases inevitably would expire on December 31, 1973. 
Plaintiffs attached to their complaint as Exhibit nB" 
portions of some minutes of 1965 Board meetings: (a) On January 
20, 1965, the Board considered the proposed amendments of oil 
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shale lease and new lease forms. Frank J. Allen was shown to 
have been present. The minutes expressly state that "The 
Land Board also adopted as a definite provision an exchange 
fee to be charged persons substituting old leases for leases on 
the new form, of 6^  per acre/1 (b) on April 16, 1965, the Board 
gave final approval to the form of application and the amended oil 
shale lease form, and (c) in the meetings of September 8, 9, and 
10, as shown by minutes as amended October 12, 1965, the amended 
form of lease was approved by the Board. The Attorney General also 
approved such amended lease as to form by letter dated September 20, 
1965 (R. 9-11). The filing fee of $2.00 for application to lease 
had been included in the Rules of the Land Board some time previ-
ously. 
Section 65-1-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
for years has expressly provided: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, the State 
Land Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe 
the form of application, the form of lease, the annual 
rental, the amount of royalty, * * * and such other 
details as it may deem necessary in the interests of 
the State." 
Not only does such statute require the application for 
mineral lease and the mineral lease itself to be in writing, but 
Section 65-1-18 also requires applications for mineral leases, 
as well as mineral leases, to be in writing, by specifying: 
25 ' 
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• " * * * All mineral leases issued by the 
Board shall contain such terms and provisions as 
the Board deems to be in the best interest of the 
State. * * * Applications for mineral leases shall 
be on such forms as the Board shall prescribe." 
Section 65-1-76 expressly requires that: 
"All leases and contracts of every kind entered 
into by the State Land Board shall# before execution 
by such Board, be approved as to form by the Attorney 
General." 
It would be utterly impossible for the Attorney General 
to approve either an application for a lease or any mineral lease 
or any other contract, except one in writing. The foregoing statu-
tory requirements preclude any "oral understanding" or any "implied 
contract." 
Furthermore, Section 65-1-45# as amended in 1967, provided, 
inter alia; 
"In all cases where lands become available for 
leasing by the land board because they are newly ac-
quired, or because an existing mineral lease is can-
celed, relinquished, surrendered, or for any reason 
terminates, except where the land board determines it 
is not in the best interest of the State to offer the 
land for lease, the land board shall offer the land 
for subsequent mineral leasing by the following proce-
dure only: 
"(a) A notice of the lands having so become avail-
able for leasing shall be posted in the State Land Office. 
The notice shall describe the land, indicate what mineral 
interest in each tract is available for leasing and state 
the last date, which shall be fifteen days after the 
notice is posted, on which bids will be received. 
"(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) all 
applications for the lease of such lands filed before 
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the closing date stated in the notice shall be 
considered to have been filed simultaneously. 
Such applications shall be submitted in sealed en-
velopes and shall be opened in the land office at 
ten o'clock on the morning of the first business 
day following the last day on which bids are receiv-
able • The land board shall award leases to the high-
est responsible, qualified bidder in terms of the 
bonus paid in addition to the first year's rental 
who regularly submitted a bid in the manner required 
by this act. In all cases of identical bids of suc-
cessful bidders, right to lease shall be determined 
by drawing. Drawings shall be participated in only 
by those among whom the right to lease is equal, but 
shall be accomplished publicly at the State land board 
office. 
"(c) At the discretion of the land board, mineral 
leases may be offered at public auction upon such terms, 
conditions, and minimum bid as may be prescribed by the 
board. 
11
 (d) Following the awarding of leases to the 
successful bidders, all deposits except filing fees 
made by unsuccessful bidders shall be returned." 
(Emphasis added) 
The above-quoted portions of said amended Section 65-1-45 
were in operation and effect when plaintiffs' 1963 oil shale leases 
automatically expired and terminated on December 31, 1973, at the 
end of the primary term of 10 years, inasmuch as there was no pro-
duction within any of the leaseholds to effectuate an extension of 
the primary term of 10 years. When those leases terminated by ex-
piration, any further mineral leasing became subject to the competi-
tive bidding procedures required by Section 65-1-45, as amended. 
The Board had no authority to offer "or accept an offer made for 
any noncompetitive oil shale lease with respect to those lands.11 
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Plaintiffs had allowed the 1965 offer to amend those 
1963 oil shale leases to expire and terminate by operation of 
law as a result of the admitted failure and neglect of plaintiffs 
themselves to timely execute and deliver the required amendatory 
documents and to pay the specified fees stated in the letter of 
September 29, 1965. Having the option to either accept such of-
fer by complying with its specific terms and conditions, or not 
to accept it, plaintiffs allowed that offer to expire and permitted 
their 1963 leases to terminate. The Board did not terminate those 
leases. The 1963 leases terminated by virtue of their express 
terms and conditions, because plaintiffs themselves had neglected 
to accept the offer to amend which had been made more than 8 years 
and 3 months prior to the automatic termination dates of those 
1963 leases. Upon their expiration, said leases ceased to have 
any legal existence. 
In consequence of the fatal admissions made by plaintiffs, 
there being no material issue of fact nor of law as to termination 
of those 1963 oil shale leases by reason of their automatic expira-
tion and termination at the end of 1973, the District Court properly 
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment of "no cause of 
action" as a matter of law and for dismissal of the action with 
prejudice. The District Court also properly denied plaintiffs' 
counter-motion for summary judgment. 
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POINT II. 
THERE WAS NO JURY QUESTION, BUT EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS HAD 
REQUESTED A JURY TRIAL, DEFENDANTS WOULD HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO 
A DIRECTED VERDICT OF "NO CAUSE OF ACTION" IN VIEW OF PLAINTIFFS1 
ADMISSIONS. 
The headnote under Point I of the Brief of Appellants 
correctly states that "BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE COURT 
HAS RULED THAT THE EVIDENCE COULD NOT SUPPORT JURY FINDINGS OF 
IMPLIED CONTRACT OR ESTOPPEL." In consequence of the admissions 
made by plaintiffs, and the express language of written documents, 
there was no competent evidence to warrant any findings by a jury 
or by the court of either "implied contract" or "estoppel." Not 
only did defendants make a motion for summary judgment supported 
by uncontroverted affidavits, but plaintiffs themselves made a 
counter-motion for summary judgment, to which was attached an 
affidavit of one of the plaintiffs, John H. Morgan, Jr. At the 
time of oral argument, the court made inquiry as to whether there 
was any additional evidence which could be presented if a trial 
were conducted. On page 1 of the Brief of Appellants, it is stated: 
"The parties conceded that their evidence (in-
cluding affidavits covering all testimony they would 
adduce at trial) was before the court," and the court 
"ruled that Appellants had no cause of action as a 
matter of law." 
The cases cited on pages 4 and 5 of the Brief of Appellants 
clearly hold that summary judgment is^  warranted when there is n£ 
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material issue of fact to be resolved, and there remains only a 
question of law. In Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 
624, it was held that "no genuine issue of material fact was 
raised and defendant's motion for summary judgment was properly 
granted." This Court further declared: 
"The purpose of the summary judgment procedure 
is to pierce the allegations of the pleadings, show 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, al-
though an issue may be raised by the pleadings, and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
"It is apparent here that the defendant has pro-
disced evidence that pierces the allegations of the 
complaint. The plaintiffs have not controverted, ex-
plained or destroyed that evidence by counteraffidavit 
or otherwise * * * ." (10 Utah 2d at page 269). 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants, by their 
complaint, by responses to requests for admissions and by answers 
to interrogatories clearly showed that their 1963 oil shale leases 
would expire and terminate December 31, 1973; that notwith-
standing* the Director of the State Land Board, on behalf of the 
Board, issued a written offer to amend those 1963 leases by letter 
dated September 29, 1965. Plaintiffs-appellants did not accept 
said offer to amend, which offer could be accepted only by com-
pliance with all four requirements stated in that letter-offer. 
We now examine the affidavit of plaintiff, John H. Morgan, 
Jr., which was attached to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
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(R. 112-115). Morgan did not controvert the affidavits attached 
to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. He recited that 
he was the plaintiff to whom correspondence from defendants had 
been referred; that on or about April 8, 1965, the lessees en-
tered into contract with Husky Oil Company, modified on May 25# 
1964; that such contract was known to the Land Board; that affi-
ant caused the leases and assignments of leases to be delivered 
to plaintiff, Husky Oil Company (but he made no claim that those 
assignments of leases were ever filed with the State Land Board 
with a request for approval). At the hearing before the Board on 
April 17# 1974# on plaintiffs' unique request that the Board "ac-
knowledge that said leases had been extended," it was undisputed 
that no assignments of the 1963 leases to Husky Oil Company were 
ever filed with the Board and approved, so that all correspondence 
was appropriately sent to the original lessees of record, including 
the letter dated September 29, 1965. It was admitted at such hear-
ing before the Board, on behalf of plaintiffs, that no documents 
for amendment of the 1963 oil shale leases had ever been executed and 
delivered to the State Land Office prior to the expiration dates 
of the 1963 leases; and that said John H. Morgan, Jr., had told 
an assistant attorney general that the six cents ($.06) per acre 
had not been paid, and that it probably had been "overlooked" 
(R. 102-104). 
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However# in said affidavit of plaintiff Morgan, 
it was alleged that affiant: 
" • • . on behalf of the original lessees, 
has since transmitted all notices except bill-
ings and all correspondence from defendants with 
regard to the Leases (including the letters and 
enclosures of May 11 and September 29, 1965, re-
ferred to in the pleadings herein) to plaintiff 
Husky Oil Company; that affiant believed, at all 
times after referral of the aforesaid 1965 corres-
pondence to Husky Oil Company, that the Leases had 
been converted to the oil shale lease form adopted 
by defendants in 1965; * * *"(R. 113-114). (Em-
phasis added) 
The admissions contained in the complaint and estab-
lished on discovery proceedings conclusively show that whatever 
belief plaintiff John H. Morgan, Jr., entertained for more than 
8 years and 3 months was not only contrary to the actual facts, 
but utterly preposterous and unreasonable. Neither the complaint 
nor the affidavit of Morgan even alleged that Morgan or any of the 
other plaintiffs at any time bothered to execute any of the amenda-
tory documents or to pay any of the fees required for acceptance 
of the 1965 offer of the Board for amendment of the 1963 oil shale 
leases. An utterly unfounded belief could not possibly dispense 
with compliance for acceptance of the written offer to amend. 
Even if plaintiffs had intended to accept the offer to amend and 
had even executed the required amendatory documents submitted to 
them and had written out the checks for payment of the required 
fees but neglected to deliver the executed documents and the 
32 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
checks for the required fees to the State Land Office, plaintiffs 
could not have effectuated an amendment of any of those 1963 
leases. 
It will be observed that the claim made in the affi-
davit of plaintiff Morgan, attached to the counter-motion for 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs to the effect that af-
fiant believed that the "leases had been converted to the oil 
shale lease form adopted by defendants in 1965#" was utterly 
inconsistent with the unique request to the Board in 1974 to 
"acknowledge that said leases had been extended/1 when the 
Board never made any offer to merely extend the primary term 
of the 1963 leases. Such alleged belief that the 1963 leases 
"had been converted to the oil shale lease form adopted by de-
fendants in 1965" also was materially at variance with the 
specious conclusion in a subsequent part of said affidavit to 
the effect that affiant "relied on the issuance of rental" 
notices "as a representation and acknowledgment that the Leases 
had been extended"(R. 114-115). The Board never made any offer 
for a mere extension of the primary term of the 1963 leases, 
either gratuitously or on condition of payment of specified fees. 
The 1965 amended form of oil shale lease involved not only a 
longer primary term but included provisions differing from the 
original 1963 form of oil shale leases. 
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By his affidavit said plaintiff Morgan further recited 
that about November 28, 1973, he received from defendant 1974 
"rental billings" (rental notices) for each and all of the 
leases in the same manner as were the "billings" for all other 
State mineral leases; that shortly after receipt of such "bill-
ings" Husky Oil Company instructed affiant to pay the same; that 
" • . . affiant, on December 31, 1973, hand 
delivered to defendants the check and letter of 
which copies are attached as "Exhibit C ; that 
the time stamp appearing on Exhibit C was af-
fixed on the original and on affiant*s copy at 
the State Land Office by defendants' employee; 
that affiant and all plaintiffs, in affiant's be-
lief, relied on the issuance of the 1974 rental 
billings for the Leases as a representation and ac-
knowledgment that the Leases had been extended; that 
it is affiant's practice each year to check billings 
received against lease records to verify that all 
leases considered to be in continuing effect have 
been the subject of billing so that any questions 
can be resolved before the end of the lease year; 
on receipt of the 1974 rental billings for the 
Leases at $1.00 per acre (whereas the rental rate 
had been 50c per acre for the first ten years) af-
fiant and his associates in fact checked the bill-
ings against plaintiffs' lease records for the 
Leases and proceeded thereafter on the understanding 
confirmed by the billings that the Leases had in fact 
been extended; that, except for his receipt of bill-
ings for the Leases, affiant would have been alerted 
to danger of termination and would have acted to pre-
vent it; that, as soon as defendants informed affiant 
of defendants' contention the Leases had expired, af-
fiant and all plaintiffs took all reasonable action 
to correct any possible defect in the procedures for 
extension they had followed "(R. 114-115). 
Plaintiff Morgan used the term "rental billings" in lieu 
of the correct term "rental notice" in a possible attempt to infer 
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that the State had some duty to issue such notice. The State 
statutes, Title 65, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953# as amended, do not 
require the Board to issue any advance notice of any rental 
which may become due under the terms of a mineral lease. It is 
significant that in connection with plaintiffs1 counter-motion 
for summary judgment, they presented a copy of the Rules and 
Regulations of the Board as amended to June, 1973. "RULE 14 -
RENTAL NOTICES", reads as follows: 
"Advance notice of rental due is usually sent 
to the Lessees by the State Land Board, but failure 
to receive such notices shall not act to relieve the 
lessee from the payment of the rental and the lease 
shall be in default if such payment is not made as 
provided in the lease"(R. 164). 
The rule adopted by the Board for sending notice of "rental 
due" does not authorize anyone in the State Land Office to send a 
notice of "rental due" for a year following the expiration of a 
mineral lease. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs-appellants expressly 
alleged and proved that their leases automatically expired and 
terminated December 31, 1973, there could not possibly have been 
any rental due for 1974. Paragraph 7 of the uncontroverted affi-
davit of Charles R. Hansen, Director of the Division of State 
Lands, shows that no one was authorized to send any rental notice 
for "1974 rentals" on the 1963 oil shale leases except to oil 
shale lease owners whose leases had been amended and therefore 
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continued to exist after December 31, 1973; and that the 
sending of any rental notice on 1963 oil shale leases des-
cribed in paragraph 3 of the complaint was a clerical error 
(R. 100). The uncontroverted affidavit of Donald G. Prince 
(presently assistant director), who has been a member of the 
staff of the State Land Office since 1954, also shows that he 
did not authorize the sending of the so-called "billings for 
1974 rentals" to plaintiffs, and that sending such notices 
was a clerical error (R. 107). 
There was no contract right nor statutory right nor 
any right, under Rule 14, to receive a rental notice (which 
appellants have described as a "rental billing"). Consequently, 
the sending of erroneous rental notices for 1974, which was the 
year beyond the expiration dates of the 1963 oil shale leases, 
could not impose on the lessees, whose leases were expiring on 
December 31, 1973, any legal duty to pay any rental for 1974. 
On December 31, 1973, Utah Resources International, Inc., by 
its president, John H. Morgan, Jr., left at the State Land 
Office a check for $24,258.50 for "1974 rentals" (R. 46-48, 
50-51). That check was shown by the accompanying letter to 
be for 1974 rentals actually becoming due for 1974 on certain 
oil, gas and hydrocarbon leases and bituminous sands leases— 
leases not expiring December 31, 1973. Included in such check 
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for $24,258.50 was an aggregate amount of $13,834.00 for 
"1974 rentals" on 1963 oil shale leases (which were expir-
ing December 31, 1973). As shown by the affidavit of Donald 
G. Prince, Assistant Director of the Division of State Lands, 
said check was deposited for collection about January 4, 1974, 
for the reason it included sums becoming due for rentals on 
oil, gas and hydrocarbon leases and bituminous sands leases 
which would not expire on December 31, 1973 (R. 49-53). 
When it was ascertained that the 1963 oil shale leases 
had not been amended and that they had expired December 31, 
1973, the Board, on-March 8, 1974, directed refunds in the 
total amount of $13,834.00, included in the check for $24,258.50 
for 1974 rentals, because 1974 rentals were not payable on those 
oil shale leases expiring December 31, 1973 (R. 46-48, 49-53). 
Refund checks were issued and mailed March 12, 1974, by the 
Director of the Division of State Lands (R. 52, 68-69). As 
stated on page 4 of the Brief of Appellants, "the board re-
turned the money to Appellants, with the announcement that it 
considered the Leases to have expired"(R. 50-52). 
On February 26, 1974, which was nearly two months after 
the 1963 oil shale leases expired, Utah Resources International, 
Inc., by John H. Morgan, Jr., its president, issued a check to 
the Division of State Lands in the amount of $829.78 for the 
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computed six cents ($.06) per acre in the 1963 oil shale 
leases (which had not been amended). Following a hearing 
before the Board on April 17, 1974, at the request of ap-
pellants that the Board "acknowledge that said leases had 
been extended," the Board denied such application and advised 
applicants in writing that they had failed to prove compli-
ance with the terms and conditions of the letter dated 
September 29, 1965, and that all of the 1963 oil shale leases 
issued to them had expired December 31, 1973, and could not 
be reinstated nor extended. The check for $829.78, dated 
February 26, 1974, was then returned (R. 65-69, 70-71). In 
his hereinabove-mentioned affidavit, plaintiff, John H. Morgan, 
Jr., by substituting the term "rental billings" sometimes used 
in lieu of "rental notices," jumped to an incompetent conclu-
sion predicated on his alleged belief in disregard of the facts, 
which he claimed was shared by other plaintiffs. Without any 
factual foundation, Morgan resorted to a self-serving, invalid 
conclusion: 
" . . . that affiant and all plaintiffs, in 
affiant's belief, relied on the issuance of the 
1974 rental billings for the Leases as a representa-
tion and acknowledgment that the Leases had been 
extended . . . ", 
but he did not even mention what his belief was as to the period 
of time those leases were believed to have been extended. Nor 
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did said plaintiff give any clue as to how those 1963 leases 
could have been gratuitously extended for some unstated period 
of days, months or years, when the Board never made any offer 
for a mere extension of the 1963 leases# gratuitously or even 
in consideration of payment of some fees. 
Independent of lack of authorization for any of the 
rental notices in question, they did not contain any language 
which reasonably could be construed to constitute either a repre-
sentation or an acknowledgment that any of the 1963 oil shale 
leases in controversy had been "extended" by the State Land 
Board, While plaintiff Morgan claimed "reliance" on documents 
which did not purport to be more than mere rental notices for 
1974 rentals, he did not recite any facts which could show any 
actual representation that there was an "extension," nor any 
right to rely on those rental notices as an "acknowledgment" by 
the State that the leases had been "extended," nor any reasonable 
reliance. On the contrary, he refuted his professions of "reli-
ance" on the unauthorized 1974 rental notices by admissions 
which would compel a finding that he did not rely on those un-
signed rental notices, and that he had no right to rely on such 
rental notices, by saying: 
"It is affiant's practice each year to check 
billings received against lease records to verify 
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that all leases considered to be in continuing 
effect have been the subject of billing so that 
any questions can be resolved before the end of 
the lease year; on receipt of the 1974 rental 
billings for the Leases at $1.00 per acre * * * 
affiant and his associates in fact checked the 
billings against plaintiffs1 lease records for 
the Leases"(R. 114-115). 
Inasmuch as plaintiffs admitted that they "in fact checked 
the billings against plaintiffs1 lease records/1 they could not 
possibly have found in those lease records any Amended Oil 
Shale Lease offered in 1965# because plaintiffs had failed to 
pay the required fees and had neglected to execute and deliver 
the required amendatory documents specified in the letter-offer 
of September 29, 1965. Plaintiffs did not claim, nor could they 
truthfully claim, that when they checked their lease records 
against the purported 1974 rental notices, they actually found 
in those lease records any amended 1965 form of oil shale lease, 
for it is undisputed that plaintiffs never did any of the things 
required for acceptance of the 1965 amendatory offer. After at-
tempting to show diligence by checking their lease records, 
plaintiff Morgan resorted to the absurd conclusionary argument 
that plaintiffs 
" . . . proceeded thereafter on the understand-
ing confirmed by the billings that the Leases had 
in fact been extended . . . ", 
when common sense would compel a conclusion that the pretended 
"understanding"was merely a false assumption. An examination 
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of the lease records by any intelligent person would alert 
such person to the fact that there was no executed copy of 
the 1965 amended form of oil shale lease in the lease records, 
because plaintiffs had failed and neglected to do the things 
essential for acceptance of the 1965 offer for amendment of those 
leases. 
Plaintiffs admittedly had done nothing to accept the 
1965 offer to amend, made more than 8 years and 3 months prior 
to the December 31, 1973, lease expiration date. During that 
entire time, plaintiffs claimed they entertained a belief 
(which was utterly false), to the effect that the 1963 leases 
had been "extended,11 when the Board never had made any offer 
to gratuitously extend the primary term of the 1963 leases. 
Nevertheless, affiant Morgan attempted to excuse the inexcusable 
negligence of plaintiffs to take the required steps for amend-
ment of the leases by the self-serving proclamation that 
"except for his receipt of billings for the 
Leases, affiant would have been alerted to danger of 
termination and would have acted to prevent it;" 
but affiant failed to disclose just what he possibly could or 
would have done to prevent expiration of the 1963 leases on 
December 31, 1973, since there never had been any amendment of 
those leases in accordance with the terms of the only offer ever 
made by the Board for their amendment. 
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Then affiant Morgan, on behalf of himself and his 
co-plaintiffs, finally resorted to the specious argument: 
" • • . that as soon as defendants informed 
affiant of defendants' contention that the Leases 
had expired, affiant and all plaintiffs took all 
reasonable action to correct any possible defect 
in the procedures for extension they had followed." 
(R. 115). 
The fact is that plaintiffs never followed any "proce-
dures for extension." Neither affiant Morgan nor any of the 
other plaintiffs ever stated just what they claimed they did 
which could possibly constitute "all reasonable action to cor-
rect any possible defect in the procedures for extension they 
had followed." The representation that plaintiffs followed any 
"procedures for extension" of the 1963 leases was entirely with-
out factual foundation. The only "defects in procedure" con-
sisted of the neglect of plaintiffs to do any of the things for 
timely acceptance of the Board's 1965 offer to amend the leases. 
The plaintiffs had no power to unilaterally "extend" the primary 
term of those 1963 leases. Consequently, there was no "reason-
able action" which plaintiff could have taken on December 31, 
1973, to prevent expiration of those leases at the end of that 
day. 
The respondents were entitled to summary judgment of 
"no cause of action," for appellants presented, by the affidavit 
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of John H. Morgan, Jr., all of the "evidence" on which plaintiffs 
would have relied if there had been a trial. Assuming that there 
had been a jury trial, defendants-respondents would have been en-
titled to a directed verdict of "no cause of action," for the 
following reasons: (a) The testimony (as outlined and set 
forth in the affidavit of plaintiff, John H. Morgan, Jr.) con-
sisted of declarations of belief contrary to the actual factsP 
(b) The evidence consisting of unwarranted false assumptions and 
conclusions was incompetent, (c) There were fatal admissions of 
fact which conclusively showed that plaintiffs received the writ-
ten offer to amend the 1963 lease under date of September 29, 1965, 
but never executed and delivered any of the amendatory documents 
nor paid any of the required fees for effectuating any amendment. 
(d) The rental notices for 1974 rentalsjon the 1963 leases in 
question never were authorized and sending them was a clerical 
error, (e) While plaintiffs claimed that they "relied" on such 
rental notices (which they chose to refer to as "rental billings") 
"as a representation and acknowledgment that the Leases had been 
extended," independent of the issuance of such rental notices by 
clerical error and without authority, there was no language in 
such rental notices which reasonably could be construed to con-
stitute either a representation or an acknowledgment by an au-
thorized person that any of the 1963 oil shale leases had been 
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unilaterally "extended" by the Board, (f) There could not 
have been any reasonable reliance on such rental notices, 
since plaintiffs "checked those rental" notices with their 
lease records. By checking with the lease records, any rea-
sonable person would have been alerted to the fact that those 
leases had not been amended nor "extended" in consequence of 
plaintiffs' own neglect, (g) There was nothing plaintiffs 
could possibly do under the Utah statutes on December 31, 1973, 
when a check was presented to cover not only "rentals" for 1974 
on the leases expiring that day but also for rentals due on 
mineral leases not then expiring* (h) Refund checks were mailed 
March 12, 1974, for rentals offered on the expiring 1963 oil 
shale leases, (i) Contrary to the arguments of appellants, their 
leases expired and terminated by their own terms. Respondents 
did not terminate any of those leases. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANTS' ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ON THE STATE LAND BOARD 
A NEBULOUS "IMPLIED CONTRACT BY ESTOPPEL" FOR EITHER EXTENSION 
OF THE TERM OF THE 1963 LEASES OR REPLACEMENT OF THOSE LEASES 
BY THE 1965 AMENDED FORM OF OIL SHALE LEASES, NOTWITHSTANDING 
APPELLANTS' OWN ADMITTED NEGLECT TO ACCEPT TIMELY THE 1965 OF-
FER TO AMEND, WOULD VIOLATE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE PAROLE 
EVIDENCE RULE, AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH STATUTES. 
Under Point II, on pages 7 to 12 of the Brief of Appel-
lants, there is a nebulous argument that "the evidence would 
justify a jury in finding extension of the leases by implied 
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contract." Under Point II of this Brief of Respondents# we 
point out that even if there had been a jury trial, the de-
fendants would have been entitled to a directed verdict of 
"no cause of action" for lack of any competent evidence to 
support the claims asserted by plaintiffs. No jury could rea-
sonably believe that plaintiffs-appellants had done what they 
admitted they never did. 
By further argument, on page 6 of Brief of Appellants# 
claim is made that "the conduct of Respondents in this case 
implied a promise to renew or extend the Leases/' but there was 
no competent evidence, nor was there any evidence that the State 
declared a "forfeiture." The 1963 leases all terminated by ex-
piration in accordance with the terms of the leases. On page 8# 
appellants contend that "a contract may be established by con-
duct alone without any expression in writing or by parole." 
They cite Kimball Elevator Co. y# Elevator Supplies Co., 2 Utah 
2d SfiJV In that case, the jury, by instruction, was permitted 
to speculate and find an "implied agreement" from a "course of 
dealing" involving a number of unaccepted written offers. In 
reversing the judgment based on such jury verdict, this Court 
observed that "the basis upon which Kimball seeks to make out 
a promise on the part of Elevator Supplies not to submit a com-
petitive bid is nebulous indeed." Furthermore, this Court in 
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! 
that case stated what counsel for appellants in this case 
seems to have overlooked: 
« * * * Nevertheless we fail to see how, 
taking all of the evidence and every reasonable 
inference that may fairly be derived therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
, as we are obliged to do, a finding that Elevator 
Supplies made any such promise in the instant 
'l case can be supported. Likewise we find no cir-
cumstances here from which it could reasonably 
* be concluded that silence or inaction with re-
spect to such request amounted to an acceptance.ff 
5 On page 6 of their brief, appellants cite Oil Shale 
Corporation v. Larson, 20 Utah 2d 369, 438 P.2d 540, but that 
case does not support any contentions of appellants. That 
case involved interpretation of a written instrument, which 
document this Court held to be unenforceable, among other rea-
sons, for lack of any provision as to when the lease would be-
gin or when it would end. Consequently, if a written agreement 
for a lease must specify a termination date, there certainly 
could not be any "implied oral agreement'1 for extension of a 
lease without a definite understanding as to when the claimed 
"extension" would end. 
On page 9 of their brief, counsel for appellants admit: 
"We find no Utah case where the promise inferred from conduct was 
specifically to extend a lease." Counsel for appellants also 
overlook the fact that the express provisions of Sections 
65-1-18 and 23, U.C.A. 1953, require an application for mineral 
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lease, as well as a mineral lease to be in writing. Defendants-
Respondents not only invoked the parole evidence rule but, by 
affirmative defenses, pleaded said Utah statutes and also the 
Statutes of Fraud, Sections 25-5-1 and 4(1); also that all leases 
and contracts entered into by the State Land Board must be ap-
proved as to form by the Attorney General, Section 65-1-76, 
U.C.A. 1953. All of those statutes would bar any claim of "im-
plied contract" by "estoppel" or otherwise. ^' 
Nevertheless, on page 9 of the Brief of Appellants, it 
is argued that "the board indicated its understanding that the 
Leases were extended not only by amending its accounting records 
to show an additional ten-year account period, but also by bill-
ing and receiving 1974 rental at a rate which could only apply 
to a period beyond the initial term of the lease." However, as 
shown under Point II of this brief, the Board did not authorize 
the sending of any rental notices (which plaintiffs referred to 
as "billings"), except on leases not expiring. As shown by the 
affidavit of the former director of the State Land Board (R. 96), 
he did not authorize any change in the accounting cards, except 
as to those 1963 oil shale leases where the lease owners complied 
with the terms and conditions of the letter-offer to amend, dated 
September 29, 1965. The affidavit of Charles R. Hansen, present 
director of the Division of State Lands (R. 99), denies that he 
!
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authorized any changes in the accounting cards, except as to 
those leases with respect to which there had been full compli-
ance with the requirements of the letter of September 29, 1965. 
Both of those affiants denied there was any oral "understanding." 
Furthermore, two of the accounting cards never were changed to 
include a "new payment schedule" (R. 50-51). Notwithstanding 
the argument that the accounting records were changed, the affi-
davit of John H. Morgan, Jr., does not show that he knew anything 
about the alleged changes until after the 1963 leases expired. 
He, therefore, could not have relied on those office records for 
some undefined "understanding." Furthermore, the accounting 
records were intended for office use, and they could not possibly 
be construed as a part of an "implied contract." There was no 
proof of a meeting of the minds. 
Contrary to the argument, under Point III of Brief of 
Appellants, starting on page 13, there was no conduct of the 
Board which could "estop" the Board "to deny the extension of 
the leases." We agree with the doctrine announced in Farmers 
and Merchants Bank v. Universal CIT Corporation, 4 Utah 2d 155, 
289 P.2d 1045, that "equitable estoppel" is based on the concept 
that when one person makes representations to another which 
warrant the latter in acting in a given way, the one who made 
the representations will not be permitted to change his position 
when such change would bring about inequitable consequences. 
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There were no "representations11 made by the Board to work any 
"estoppel", equitable or otherwise. The appellants seem to 
have their concepts of estoppel in reverse, for the Board made 
no representations to induce plaintiffs not to accept the Board's 
offer of September 29, 1965. Plaintiffs simply neglected to ac-
cept the written offer. As to payment of "1974 rentals/1 in con-
sequence of the erroneous unauthorized 1974 rental notices, when 
the Board ascertained that the 1963 leases had expired December 
31, 1973, and that no rentals could possibly be due for 1974 
rentals, the Board, on March 8, 1974, ordered refunds, and the 
Director issued and mailed the refund checks on March 12, 1974. 
Appellants acknowledge the refunds, as shown on page 4: "The 
Board returned the money to Appellants with the announcement that 
it considered the Leases to have expired (R. 50-52)." 
There is no merit to the suggestion made on page 12 of 
their brief that appellants should have been given a 30-day "writ-
ten notice" to "rectify a claimed delinquency" in accordance with 
Section 65-1-90, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, by reason of appellants1 
failure to comply with the letter-offer of September 29, 1965. 
That provision of the statutes relates to violation of a provi-
sion of a mineral lease. The Board never claimed any default nor 
any violation of the terms of the 1963 leases. The Board did not 
"terminate the lease without notice;" nor any of those leases. 
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offer to amend, permitted those leases to expire and terminate 
by their own terms. Appellants' own arguments concerning "im-
plied contract" and "estoppel" illustrate the fallacies of those 
arguments by trying to make the Board responsible for appellants' 
own failure to timely accept the 1965 offer to amend the leases. 
On page 15 of the Brief of Appellants, it is appropriately 
stated: "We are not aware of a Utah case where estoppel has been 
applied directly against the Utah State Land Board," but appel-
lants cite a number of cases which have no possible application 
to the actual facts of this case. Finally, appellants, on page 
16, complain that the Board did not issue some regulations with 
respect to the conversion of oil shale leases. The 1965 offer 
to amend was issued to every lease owner of record. If there 
were any basis to appellants' argument that the letter-offer of 
September 29, 1965, was unauthorized because there was no "regula-
tion" covering the subject matter, then there was nothing to pre-
vent the expiration of the 1963 oil shale leases on December 31, 
1973. That argument also refutes their claims of "estoppel." 
On page 16 of their brief, appellants argue, without 
foundation, that they "relied" on an "amendment of accounting 
records" and "acceptance" by the Board of "1974 rentals." They 
could not possibly have relied on unauthorized changes on 
":; 50 . 
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There were no "representations" made by the Board to work any 
"estoppel", equitable or otherwise. The appellants seem to 
have their concepts of estoppel in reverse, for the Board made 
no representations to induce plaintiffs not to accept the Board's 
offer of September 29, 1965. Plaintiffs simply neglected to ac-
cept the written offer. As to payment of "1974 rentals," in con-
sequence of the erroneous unauthorized 1974 rental notices, when 
the Board ascertained that the 1963 leases had expired December 
31, 1973, and that no rentals could possibly be due for 1974 
rentals, the Board, on March 8, 1974, ordered refunds, and the 
Director issued and mailed the refund checks on March 12, 1974. 
Appellants acknowledge the refunds, as shown on page 4: "The 
Board returned the money to Appellants with the announcement that 
it considered the Leases to have expired (R. 50-52)." 
There is no merit to the suggestion made on page 12 of 
their brief that appellants should have been given a 30-day "writ-
ten notice" to "rectify a claimed delinquency" in accordance with 
Section 65-1-90, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, by reason of appellants' 
failure to comply with the letter-offer of September 29, 1965. 
That provision of the statutes relates to violation of a provi-
sion of a mineral lease. The Board never claimed any default nor 
any violation of the terms of the 1963 leases. The Board did not 
"terminate the lease without notice;" nor any of those leases. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, by their own neglect to accept the 1965 
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offer to amend, permitted those leases to expire and terminate 
by their own terms. Appellants' own arguments concerning "im-
plied contract" and "estoppel" illustrate the fallacies of those 
arguments by trying to make the Board responsible for appellants' 
own failure to timely accept the 1965 offer to amend the leases. 
On page 15 of the Brief of Appellants, it is appropriately 
stated: "We are not aware of a Utah case where estoppel has been 
applied directly against the Utah State Land Board," but appel-
lants cite a number of cases which have no possible application 
to the actual facts of this case. Finally, appellants, on page 
16, complain that the Board did not issue some regulations with 
respect to the conversion of oil shale leases. The 1965 offer 
to amend was issued to every lease owner of record. If there 
were any basis to appellants' argument that the letter-offer of 
September 29, 1965, was unauthorized because there was no "regula-
tion" covering the subject matter, then there was nothing to pre-
vent the expiration of the 1963 oil shale leases on December 31, 
1973. That argument also refutes their claims of "estoppel." 
On page 16 of their brief, appellants argue, without 
foundation, that they "relied" on an "amendment of accounting 
records" and "acceptance" by the Board of "1974 rentals." They 
could not possibly have relied on unauthorized changes on 
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office accounting records which they did not even claim to have 
seen at any time before their leases terminated by expiration. 
Appellants have cited a number of cases and some text statements# 
none of which hold that a party who has allowed his state min-
eral lease to expire has a right of action to compel the State to 
suspend the operation of its statutes to grant him either an ex-
tension of the primary term of a lease after it has expired or 
an amended lease which he rejected by nonacceptance of an offer 
to amend made more than 8 years previously. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
By way of conclusion counsel for appellants declares 
that they "acted in good faith" when they admitted they did ab-
solutely nothing during a period of more than 8 years after 
they received the Board1s offer to amend. Summary judgment 
of no cause of action" was warranted by plaintiffs' own admis-
sions and affidavit# independent of defendants' affidavits. 
If there had been a jury trial, respondents would have been 
entitled to a directed verdict. Consequently, the judgment of 
the District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B . ROMNEY 
Atftbxnoy /Geri^ral 
A 
Assistant Attorney General 
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